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NOTES
POLITICAL ASYLUM AND THE REFUGEE
HIJACKER: A SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE
I.

INTRODUCTION

Two Soviet Jews attempted to hijack an Aeroflot Airliner to
Western Europe as a first step to escape to Israel. 1 These Jews were
not successful. They were arrested and convicted for their attempted escape and sentenced to fifteen years in prison. 2 A question
nevertheless remains. If these Soviets, and others similarly situated, 3 were successful, how would they be treated by the state in
which they landed? Would they be considered common criminals for
the airline hijacking, thereby subject to extradition to the Soviet
Union for prosecution of the crime? Or would these Soviet Jews be
considered political refugees, victims of persecution entitled to political asylum?
Hijacking as a means of escape from persecution is not new.
Shortly after World War II, hijacking became a popular means of
escape from behind the Iron Curtain. 4 In the 1960's, however, hijacking took on a new dimension. 5 Airline hijacking became the tool by
which the greedy, 8 the cowardly, 7 and the politically minded terror1. N.Y. Times, June 22, 1970, at 1, col. 1. While there is no record of an attempted
hijacking from the Soviet Union recently, hijacking as a means of escape from a totalitarian
regime is by no means extinct. See note 4 infra.
2. N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1970, at 3, col. 5. Twenty persons were arrested and given
sentences ranging from four years to fifteen years in prison for taking part in the plot to
escape. The two Jews who organized the activity, and who had previously been actively
seeking permission to lawfully emigrate to Israel, were initially given the death sentence for
the attempted hijacking. Id. The Supreme Court of the Soviet Union later commuted the
death sentence to fifteen years in prison. Id., Jan. 1, 1971, at 1, col. 2.
3. Id., Jan. 8, 1973, at 14, col. 1.
4. The first recorded use of hijacking as a means of escape was on April 9, 1948. Twenty
passengers and a crew member seized control of a Czechoslovakian airliner and forced it to
land in Germany. N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1948, at 1, col. 2. See also id., Mar. 25, 1953, at 1, col.
2; id .. Mar. 25, 1950, at 1, col. 2; id., May 8, 1948, at 7, col. 2.
The practice is by no means extinct. See, e.g., id., May 11, 1978, at 4, col. 3; id., Feb. 7,
1978, at 2, col. 5; id., Oct. 12, 1977, at 8, col. 4; id., Oct. 29, 1976, §I, at 5, col. 1; id., Apr.
19, 1972, at 2, col. 4; id., Oct. 28, 1970, at 1, col. 2; id., Oct. 16, 1970, at 1, col. 5; id., Nov.
21, 1970, at 3, col. 6; THE TIMES (London), Aug. 31, 1978, at 1, col. 1.
5. N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1978, § X, at 20, col. 5.
6. The most publicized and successful attempt of this kind of hijacking occurred on
November 24, 1971, when a Northwest Orient airliner was hijacked. The hijacker demanded
and received $200,000 cash, parachuted from the plane, and has never been apprehended,
although he was indicted by a grand jury for the offense. Id., Nov. 25, 1976, at 20, col. 6.
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ist8 reaped economic gain and political advantage from the international community. Strong measures were necessary to combat the
abuse to which international airline transportation had been subjected.9 As a result, several multilateral conventions 10 were signed
establishing a uniform system of dealing with offenses committed
in the air. 11
For other examples of this type of hijacking, see id., Jan. 21, 1978, at 2, col. 3; id., Apr.
8, 1976, at 18, col. 1; id., May 11, 1974, at 10, col. 1.
7. The most noteworthy example of this type of hijacking occurred on October 31, 1969.
Raphael Minichiello diverted a T.W.A. airliner from California to Rome. Minichiello claimed
he had escaped because he feared he would not get a fair trial on burglary charges he faced
in the United States. Id., Nov. 1, 1969, at 1, col. 1. See note 138 infra.
Another highly publicized hijacking of this type occurred on November 12, 1972 when a
Southern Airways airliner was hijacked to Cuba by three men, two of whom were wanted on
rape charges in Detroit. The third was a fugitive from justice in Tennesee. N.Y. Times, Nov .
13, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
8. The first hijacking of this type occurred on July 23, 1968, when an El Al airliner was
hijacked by three members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The Israeli
passengers were detained until Israel released several members of the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine. Id., July 23, 1968, at 1, col. 7.
A more recent example of terrorist hijacking is the "Entebbe" incident of June 28, 1976.
An Air France airliner was hijacked to Entebbe airport in Uganda where Israeli passengers
were detained while hijackers bargained for the release of 150 terrorists jailed in Israel, West
Germany, France, Switzerland, and Kenya. Id., June 28, 1976, at 1, col. 2. For other examples, see id., May 4, 1972, at 3, col. 1; id., Feb. 22, 1972, at 1, col. 2; id., Sept. 7, 1970, at 1,
col. 4; id., July 23, 1970, at 1, col. 6; id., Dec. 22, 1969, at 17, col. 1; id., Aug. 30, 1969, at 1,
col. 8.
9. See Hearings on Resolutions Concerning Aircraft Hijacking and Related Matters Before the House Commitee on Foreign Affairs, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. 6 ·(1970) [hereinafter cited
as Aircraft Hijacking Hearings]; Actions to Deal With the Menace of Air Piracy, 63 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 341, 341 (1970); 8. SHUBBER, JURISDICTION OVER CRIMES ON BOARD AIRCRAFT 170
(1973).
10. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, T.I.A.S. No. 7570 (entered into force Jan. 26, 1973)
[hereinafter cited as The Montreal Convention]; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, done Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192 (entered into
force Oct. 4, 1971) [hereinafter cited as The Hague Convention]; Convention on Offenses
and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, done Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941,
T.l.A.S. No. 6768, 704 U.N.T.S. 219 (entered into force (U.S.) Sept. 14, 1963) [hereinafter
cited as The Tokyo Convention].
11. Prior to the Tokyo Convention, there were no expressly formulated uniform rules
concerning offenses committed on board aircraft. Brooks, Skyjacking and Refugees: The
Effect of the Hague Convention Upon Asylum, 16 HARV. INT'L L.J. 93, 95 (1975). See Fitzgerald, The Development of International Rules Concerning Offences and Certain Other Acts
Committed on Board Aircraft, 1 CANADIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 230, 240-51 (1963); Horlick, The
Developing Law of Air Hijacking, 12 HARV. INT'L L.J. 33, 33-34 (1971).
In the absence of international rules concerning jurisdiction on board aircraft, some
offenders escaped prosecution. See, e.g., United States v. Cordova, 89 F. Supp. 298 (E.D.N .Y.
1950). During a flight between San Juan, Puerto Rico and New York, a fight broke out
between Cordova and a passenger. Cordova was charged with assault, but was not prosecuted.
The court held there was no federal jurisdiction over any act committed in aircraft while
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A contracting state in which a hijacker is found now has an
obligation to either extradite the individual to a state with jurisdiction to prosecute, 12 or submit the case to its proper authorities for
prosecution. rn The determination of whether or not to extradite depends on the nature of the crime committed. 14 If the crime is deemed
to be a political offense, 15 the state has a right to refuse extradition. 16
If the crime is deemed to be a common crime, the state must extradite the offender. 17 The definition of a political offense is determined
by the state in which the hijacker is found.' 8
A state's duty to extradite an airline hijacker conflicts with the
state's right to grant asylum. It is an established principle in international law that a state has absolute discretion to grant asylum to
whomever it wishes. 19 The right to asylum is also a basic human
right guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 20
An individual has a right not to be returned to a country in which
his life or freedom is in danger. 21
This Note will examine the circumstances under which a state
may grant asylum to an individual who has committed an airline
hijacking. It has been suggested that any airline hijacker who has
committed a political offense and is exempt from extradition is
thereby entitled to asylum. 22 It is submitted that a more limited
flying over the high seas. Under the federal law, as it existed then, there could be no punishment for crimes committed on the high seas, unless the act occurred in a vessel. Id. at 303.
See also R. v. Martin, [1956] 2 Q.B. 272, [1956] 2 W.L.R. 975.
Sees. SHUBBER, supra note 9, at 24-48; J.C. STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW 288-92 (7th ed. 1972); Abramovsky, Multilateral Conventions for the Suppression of
Unlawful Seizure and Interference with Aircraft-Part I: The Hague Convention, 13 CoLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 380, 392 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Abramovsky, The Hague Convention];
Abramovsky, Multilateral Conventions for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure and Interference with Aircraft-Part II: The Montreal Convention, 14 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 268, 278
(1975); Fitzgerald, Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft: The Tokyo
Convention of 1963, 2 CANADIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 191 (1964).
12. The Montreal Convention, supra note 10, art. 8; The Hague Convention, supra note
10, art. 8. There is no obligation to extradite under the Tokyo Convention, supra note 10, art.
16, para. 2.
13. The Montreal Convention, supra note 10, art. 7; The Hague Convention, supra note
10, art. 7.
14. See notes 160-61 infra and accompanying text.
15. See notes 164-68 infra and accompanying text.
16. See notes 162-63 infra and accompanying text.
17. See note 160 infra and accompanying text.
18. See notes 169-83 infra and accompanying text.
19. See notes 33-35 infra and accompanying text.
20. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. N810, at 71, art. 14 (1948).
21. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, done July 8, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137,
art. 33 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954) [hereinafter cited as 1951 Refugee Convention].
22. Green, Extradition u. Asylum for Aerial Hijackers, 10 ISRAEL L.J. 207, 217 (1975).
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distinction be made. Only the individual who is truly seeking refuge
from political persecution has a right to enjoy political asylum elsewhere. The terrorist or fugitive from justice, irrespective of his motives, has no right to asylum. He should, therefore, be extradited
under all circumstances.
II.
A.

THE DOCTINE OF ASYLUM

General Principles

The doctrine of asylum is the product of a number of competing
interests. 23 Its aim is to protect an individual's basic human rights, 24
while at the same time maintain legal order within individual states
and the international community. 25
For the individual, the right to asylum is a basic human right
guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 28 This
right is also recognized in the 1951 Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees 27 and its 1967 Protocol. 2K However, it is the state
in which asylum is sought that has absolute discretion to decide
whether or not asylum should be granted. 211
A state's right to grant asylum to individuals in its territory
stems from the exclusive character of territorial jurisdiction.:10 It is
23. Brooks, supra note 11, at 99. See generally Horlick, The Public and Private International Response to Aircraft Hijacking, 6 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 144, 153-54 (1972).
24. See Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, done Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223,
T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force (U.S.) Nov. 1, 1968) [hereinafter
cited as 1967 Protocol]; 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 21; Montevideo Convention on
Political Asylum, done Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3111, T.S. 882, 165 L.N.T.S. 45 (entered into
force (U.S.) Jan. 25, 1935), reprinted in 6 HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 607 (1937);
Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees, done Oct. 28, 1933, 159 L.N.T.S.
199 (entered into force June 13, 1935) [hereinafter cited as 1933 Refugee Convention!; Havana Convention on Asylum, done Feb. 20, 1928, 46 Stat. 2753, T.S. 815, 132 L.N.T.S. 301
(entered into force (U.S.) May 21, 1930), reprinted in 22 AM. J. INT'L L. (Supp.) 158 (1928);
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 79, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); Universal Declaration on Human Rights,
G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948); The American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man, reprinted in 43 AM. J. INT'L L. (Supp.) 133 (1949); M. GARCIA-MORA, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ASYLUM AS A HUMAN RIGHT (1956); Krenz, The Refugee as a Subject of
International /.,aw, 15 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 90, 104 (1966); Weis, The International Protection
of Refugees, 48 AM. J. INT'L L. 193, 198 (1954).
25. Brooks, supra note 11, at 99.
26. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
27. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 21.
28. 1967 Protocol, supra note 24.
29. Green, supra note 22, at 207.
30. See c. DE V1SSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 182-83 (1957);
S.P. SINHA, ASYLUM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 155-61 (1971); J.C. STARKE, supra note 11, at 25254; 8 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 686-87 (1968).
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an essential attribute of the sovereignty of the state that it should
possess jurisdiction over all persons and things within its territorial
limits. 31
The decision of a state to grant asylum depends on existing
international agreements, 32 municipal law, 3:1 and the nature of the
individual's offense or motive 34 in seeking asylum. In the absence of
a controlling municipal law or international agreement governing a
particular case, a state has absolute discretion to determine whether
or not asylum should be granted. 35 Where a state is a party to an
international agreement providing the circumstances under which
asylum should be granted, 38 the state has an obligation under international law to abide by the agreement. 37
31. Campania Naviera Vascongado v. Cristina S.S., [1938) A.C. 485, 496-97. See Feller,
Jurisdiction Over Offenses With a Foreign Element, in 2 A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 5, 17 (M.C. Bassiouni ed. 1973); J.C. STARKE, supra note 11, at 242-43.
32. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
33. Most states claim in theory to exclude all aliens at will. J.C. STARKE, supra note 11,
at 345.
In Great Britain this right was declared in Musgrove v. Chun Teeong Toy [1891) A.C.
272. Similarly, in the United States this view has been stated in Shaughnessy v. United States
ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S . 206 (1953); Harisiades v. Shaghnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); United
States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950); Fong Yue Ting v. United States,
149 U.S. 698 (1893); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892); The Chinese
Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
34. See notes 160-83 infra and accompanying text. But see E. McDOWELL, DIGEST OF
UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 170 (1975). The United States' criminal laws
do not recognize motive as an element of a criminal offense. Motive therefore has no bearing
on determining whether a specific act is a common crime or a political offense. M.C. BAsSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL ExTRADmON AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 384 (1974).
35. S.P. SINHA, supra note 30, at 155.
The United States Supreme Court stated in Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287
(1933):
[T)he principles of international law recognize no right to extradition apart from
treaty. While a government may, if agreeable to its own constitution .and laws,
voluntarily exercise the power to surrender a fugitive from justice to the country from
which he has fled, and it has been said that it is under a moral duty to do so ... the
legal right to demand his extradition and the correlative duty to surrender him to
the demanding country exist only when created by treaty.
While a state has no obligation under international law to grant asylum in the absence
of a treaty, there is nothing to prevent it from making such a grant if it so desires. See S.P.
SHINA, supra note 30, at 18, 155; 8 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 30, at 681.
36. E.g., 1967 Protocol, supra note 28; 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 21.
37. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, U.N.
Doc. NCONF. 39/27 at 289, art. 29, reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT'L. L. 875, 885 (1969). See T.
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 11 (2nd ed. 1973); McNAIR, LAW OF
TREATIES 5, 124, 749-52 (1961); G. VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 11 (1970); 1 M.
WHITEMAN, supra note 30, at 70-74.
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To achieve international cooperation in promoting and respecting human rights, without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion, 38 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted
by the United Nations in 1948. 39 The Declaration was intended as a
guideline of basic principles of human rights and freedoms for all
peoples of all nations. 40 It implies that an individual has certain
inalienable rights that cannot be taken away by sheer fiat of the
state. 41 One of those inalienable rights is the right to asylum from
persecution. 42 Article 14 of the Declaration expressly provides that
"[e]veryone has the right to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution." 43 This right is limited only "in the case of
prosecutions genuinely arising from nonpolitical crimes or from acts
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.".u
The right to seek asylum from persecution is a well established
principle in international law. Vattel made this right clear in The
Law of Nations; or, Principles of The Law of Nature:·•5
if the sovereign, or the greater part of the nation, will allow but one
religion in the state, those who believe and profess another religion
have a right to withdraw, and to take with them their families and
effects. For, they cannot be supposed to have subjected themselves
to the authority of men, in affairs of conscience .... ~
11

While Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
states that an individual has "the right to seek and enjoy in other
38. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3.
39. The Declaration was intended to be the first of three stages of a program designed

to achieve an international bill of rights. The three stages were to be ( 1) a declaration defining
the various human rights which ought to be respected; (2) a convention containing binding
treaty obligations regarding human rights; and (3) measures and machinery for implementation. Report of the Commission on Human Rights, 6 U .N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 1) 3, at 5-6,
U.N. Doc. E/600 (1947). See J.C. STARKE, supra note 11, at 359; 5 M. WHITEMAN, supra note
30, at 242.
40. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. N810, at 71,
preamble ( 1948). See General Assembly Adopts Declaration of Human Rights, 19 DEP'T STATE
BuLL. 751, 751 (1948); 5 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 30, at 243.
41. M. GARCIA-MORA, supra note 24, at 17-18.
42. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. N810, at 71, art.
14 (1948).
43. Id. art. 14, para. 1.
44. Id. art. 14, para. 2.
45. 3 E. VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE (1856).
46. Id. at 106.
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countries asylum from persecution," 47 there is no guarantee that
asylum will be granted. 48 According to the drafting history of Article
14, a proposal to include a provision to be granted asylum, 411 was
substituted by a right to enjoy asylum. 5°Furthermore, a declaration
is only advisory in nature. It does not have the legal force of an
international convention to which all parties are bound. 51 Thus, one
must turn to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
and its 1967 Protocol to determine the extent to which an individual
has a right to asylum.
2. CONVENTION RELATING TO THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF
REFUGEES (The 1951 Refugee Convention)
The 1951 Refugee Convention 52 aimed to protect individuals
who, driven from their country of origin by fear of persecution,
refused to return to a regime they regarded as intolerable. 5a The
Convention applies to anyone who falls within the Article l(A)(2)
47. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71, art. 14, para. 1 (1948).
48. H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 421-23 (1968).
49. Draft Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/285/Rev.1 (1948).
50. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71, art.
14 (1948).
51. United Nations Action in the Field of Human Rights, Report by the Division on
Human Rights of the United Nations Secretariat, at 163, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/2 (1974). See
Lauterpacht, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 25 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 354, 383
(1948).
·52. The Economic and Social Council of the United Nations decided in Resolution
248B(IX) of August 8, 1949 to establish an ad hoc committee consisting of government
representatives to prepare a convention relating to the international status of refugees. The
Ad Hoc Committee had its first session from January 16 to February 16, 1950, which resulted
in the Draft Declaration Relating to the Status of Refugees, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee
on Statelessness and Related Problems, U.N. Doc. E/1618 (1950). The final act was adopted
on July 28, 1951. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 2/108 (1951).
A Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees was signed on January 31, 1967. The
purpose of the Protocol was to broaden the definition of "refugee" contained in Article 1 of
the 1951 Refugee Convention to include persons who became refugees as a result of events
occurring after January 1, 1951. The Protocol incorporates Articles 2 through 34 of the 1951
Refugee Convention. 1967 Protocol, supra note 24. As of January 1, 1978 sixty-four states were
parties to the Convention: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Botswana,
Brazil, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Empire, Chile, Congo (Brazzaville),
Cyprus, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Holy See, Iceland, Iran,
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mali, Malta, Morocco, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Paraguay, Portugal, Senegal, Sudan,
Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, Zaire, and Zambia.
53. Refugees and Stateless Persons and Problems of Assistance to Refugees, Report of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 6 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 19) 5, U.N.
Doc. A/2011 (1952).
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definition of a political refugee. 54 A person who, owing to a wellfounded fear of persecution because of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion is outside the country of his origin, and who is unable to return because
of this fear, is a "political refugee" within the meaning of the Convention.55
A state, in whose territory a refugee is found, is forbidden from
forcibly returning the refugee to a country where he is likely to suffer
political persecution. 56 This doctrine of non-refoulement 57 emphasizes the highly humanitarian characteristic of the grant of asylum
to a political refugee. 58 The travaux pr~aratoires suggest a strict
interpretation of the provision. 511 Measures of expulsion may be
taken only if the continued presence of the refugee seriously threatens the country of refuge. 60
To be protected by the 1951 Refugee Convention, an individual
must be outside the country of his nationality. 111 Being outside the
country means he "has to leave, shall leave or remains outside" the
country. 62 Whether the individual has entered the country of refuge
lawfully or unlawfully is irrelevant for this purpose. 11:1 It is also irrelevant whether or not the country of the individual's origin is a party
to the Convention. 64
The individual must be outside the country of his origin because of a well-founded fear of persecution. 115 A well-founded fear
exists when "a person has actually been a victim of persecution, or
can show good reasons why he fears persecution." 1111 The fear may be
54. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 21, art. l(A)(2).
55. Id.
56. Id. art. 33(1).
Article 33(1) provides:
No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened
on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group
or political opinion.
57. The rule of non-refoulement was first established in the 1933 Refugee Convention,
supra note 24. Article 3(20) obliged contracting states "in any case, not to refuse entry to
refugees at the frontiers of their country of origin." Id.
58. c. DE VISSCHER, supra note 30, at 183.
59. S.P. SINHA, supra note 30, at 111.
60. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 21, art. 33(2).
61. Id. art. l(A)(2).
62. S.P. SINHA, supra note 30, at 100.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 21, art. l(A)(2).
66. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, U .N. Doc.

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol6/iss1/5

8

Cohen: Political Asylum

1978]

Political Asylum

119

based on past persecution, or simply the circumstances and the
background of the person concerned. 87 Persecution includes threats
to life, limb or physical freedom, 88 economic measures seriously depriving a person of all means of livelihood, 811 or persistent refusal to
permit re-entry to the home country. 70 The persecution must be for
reasons of "race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion. " 71
The protection granted under the 1951 Refugee Convention
does not extend to certain common criminals or persons guilty of
war crimes and other offenses against the international community. 72 Article l(F)(b) states that the Convention shall not apply
to anyone who has committed "a serious non-political crime outside
the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a
refugee." 73 This provision is based on Article 14 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights 74 which limits the right of asylum in
cases "of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political
crimes. " 75 The drafters of the Convention wanted to ensure that the
instrument they drew up was not abused by fugitives from justice
seeking to avoid extradition. 78
Article l(F)(a) also excludes from the scope of the Convention
anyone guilty of "a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime
against humanity. " 77 This provision is based on Article 6 of the
London Charter of the International Military Tribunal. 78 Crimes
against peace are defined as acts involving the waging of war; 711 war
crimes include murder, ill-treatment, or deportation to slave labor
No. E/1618 (1950). See 1 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS or REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
176 (1972).
67. S.P. SINHA, supra note 30, at 102.
68. See 1 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 66, at 197-201.
69. Id. at 201-09.
70. S.P. SINHA, supra note 30, at 102.
71. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 21, arts. l(A)(2), 33(1).
72. Id. art. l(F).
73. Id. art. l(F)(b).
74. 1 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 66, at 290.
75. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71, art. 14, para. 2 (1948).
76. 1 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 66, at 290.
77. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 21, art. l(F)(a).
78. The London Charter is annexed to the London Agreement for the Prosecution and
Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, done Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544,
E.A.S. 472, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 (entered into force (U.S.) Aug. 8, 1945), reprinted in 39 AM. J.
INT'L L. (Supp.) 257 (1945). See 1 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 66, at 272-74; Brooks, supra
note 11, at 103.
79. The London Charter, supra note 78, art. 6(a).
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of civilians or prisoners of war; 80 crimes against humanity are inhumane acts committed against any civilian population including extermination, enslavement, or persecution on political, racial, or religious grounds in connection with any other crime. 1u
Article l(F)(c) of the 1951 Refugee Convention excludes from
its protection any individual guilty of "acts contrary to the purposes
and principles of the United Nations." 112 The provisions of the
United Nations Charter are addressed only to governments. 11:i The
applicability of this Article seems limited, therefore, to persons occupying governmental posts.84
The purpose of the 1951 Refugee Convention is to protect individuals who, under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,"5
have a right to seek and enjoy asylum, 116 while at the same time
uphold general principles of international law that mandate extradition of one guilty of a serious crime. 117 While an individual has a
right not to be returned to a country in which he fears persecution,""
this right does not extend to a refugee who is a danger to either the
security or the community of the country in which he is found. "11
III.
A.

EXTRADITION AND THE AIRLINE HIJACKER

Extradition: General Principles 90

A state's right to grant asylum to an individual seeking it111 is
also governed by the state's obligation under existing treaties 112 or
80. Id. art. 6(b).
81. Id. art. 6(c).
82. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 21, art. l(F)(c) .
83. U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, 2.
84. 11 U.N. ESCOR (166th mtg.) (Social Commit tee) 6, U.N . Doc . E/AC .7/SR.166
(1950). See 1 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 66, at 286; Brooks, supra note 11 , at 103-04.
85. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948) .
86. 1 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 66, at 290.
87. See notes 90-101 infra and accompanying text.
88. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 21, art. 33, para . 1.
89. Id. art. 33, para. 2.
90. See generally 4 G.H. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-241 (1942); 4 J.B.
MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST 239-424 (1906); 6 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 30, at 7271122.
91. See text accompanying notes 30-37 supra.
92. The practice of asylum preceeded in origin that of extradition . Extradition, therefore,
became the exception to asylum and was rarely granted in the absence of a treaty. M.C.
BASSIOUNI, supra note 34, at 86; J.C. STARKE, supra note 11, at 350.
There are two categories of extradition treaties: the traditional type which contains a
specific list of offenses for the commission of which a fugitive will be surrendered; and the
newer type, of twentieth century origin, which simply provides for extradition in all cases
where the offense in question is punishable in both countries involved in the case . G. VON
GLAHN, supra note 37, at 252; 2 O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 722 (2d ed . 1970).
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conventions 93 to extradite one accused of committing an airline hijacking.94 Extradition is the process by which an individual, charged
with a crime against the law of a state and found within a foreign
state, is surrendered to the former state for prosecution."" The purpose of extradition is twofold: first, to ensure that serious crimes do
not go unpunished; and second, to permit the state in which the
crime occurred to punish the offender. 96
Extradition is a national act, 97 granted only when permitted
under the domestic law of the state to which the request is made.!111
Most states prohibit extradition unless bound to do so by treaty or
agreement with a foreign state. 99 In the absence of an agreement, no
obligation to extradite exists. 1011 Similarly, where there exists an ex93. The Hague Convention specifically refers to hijacking as an extraditable offense. The
Hague Convention, supra note 10, art. 8, para. 1.
For a discussion of regional conventions on extradition, see M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note
34, at 19-24.
94. While many bilateral and multilateral conventions on extradition do not specifically
refer to hijacking as an extraditable offense, under Article 8, Paragraph 1 of the Hague
Convention, hijacking is deemed to be included as an extraditable offense in any extradition
treaty existing between contracting states. See notes 124-27 infra and accompanying text.
95. M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 34, at 2; J.C. STARKE, supra note 11, at 348; 6 M.
WHITEMAN, supra note 30, at 727.
96. J.C. STARKE, supra note 11, at 349.
97. 6 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 30, at 728.
98. Id.; see 4 HACKWORTH, supra note 90, at 11.
99. Id. The Supreme Court of the United States laid down the principle that no obligation to extradite exists apart from that imposed by treaty. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14
Pet.) 540 (1840). This position has since been maintained. See Valentine v. United States ex
rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5 (1936); Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933); Rauscher v.
United States, 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
British law authorizes extradition only "where an arrangement has been made with any
foreign state with respect to the surrender to such state of any fugitive criminals . . . . "
Extradition Act of 1870, 33 & 34 Viet., c. 52, § 2 (cited in 6 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 30, at
731). The British courts have held this attitude since 1815. 2 McNAIR, INTERNATIONAL LAW
OPINIONS 41, 41-51 (1963); 6 BRITISH DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 453-61 (1965) .
In the Soviet Union, extradition "shall be granted only under the procedure and in the
cases provided for by treaties . . . . " 6 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 30, at 735.
In some states, the authority to grant extradition is conditioned on a guarantee of reciprocity from the requesting government. For example, in 1953 the Supreme Court of Venezuela surrendered an American national to Panama in the absence of a treaty with that
country. In granting the request, the Court stated that the request was "in conformity with
the public law of nations [whereby! friendly states recognize a reciprocal obligation to
surrender offenders who have taken refuge in their respective countries." In re Tribble, 20
l.L.R. 366 (Ven. Fed. Ct. 1953).
Similar provisions requiring a guarantee of reciprocity as a condition precedent may he
found in the laws of Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Iraq, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Peru,
Spain, Switzerland, and Thailand. M.C. BAsSSIOUNI, supra note 34, at 11.
100. G. VON GLAHN, supra note 37, at 252.
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tradition treaty but the particular case falis outside the treaty, the
same principle applies. 101

B. Multilateral Conventions Governing Extradition of an Airline
Hijacker
1. CONVENTION ON OFFENSES AND CERTAIN OTHER ACTS COMMITTED
ON BOARD AIRCRAFT (The Tokyo Convention)
The Tokyo Convention 102 was the initial undertaking by the
world community to establish a uniform system dealing with offenses committed in the air. 103 The purpose of the Convention is first,
to ensure that persons committing crimes on board aircraft in flight
do not escape punishment simply because no country has jurisdiction to prosecute the offender; 104 and second, to give the aircraft
commander, members of the crew or passengers special authority to
restrain any individual from committing a criminal offense on board
the aircraft. 105
There are two problems with the Tokyo Convention regarding
the treatment of airline hijackers. First, the Convention is not limited in its application to the offense of hijacking. 108 In fact, it was
not until 1963, when the Convention was in the last stage of draft101. 6 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 30, at 733.
102. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) began studying and preparing a draft Convention on jurisdiction over crimes on board aircraft in 1950. The final draft
of the Convention emerged on September 14, 1963 at Tokyo. Sixty-one states and five international organizations were present at the conference. S. SHUBBER, supra note 9, at 12.
As of January 1, 1978, eighty-nine states were parties to the Convention: Afghanistan,
Argentina, Australia, Austria, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Brazil, Burundi, Canada,
Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican ·Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, Greece,
Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast,
.Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Luxembourg, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua,
Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraquay, Phillipines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore,
South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia,
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Yugosalvia, Zaire, and
Zambia.
103. See Aircraft Hijacking Hearings, supra note 9, at 6; S. SHUBBER, .-;upra note 9, at
177; Brooks, supra note 11, at 91; Horlick, supra note 11, at 34; Mendelsohn, In-Flight Crime:
The International and Domestic Picture Under the Tokyo Convention, 53 VA. L. REv. 509,
513 (1967).
104. The Tokyo Convention, supra note 10, art. 3; J.C. STARKE, supra note 11, at 289;
Abramovsky, The Montreal Convention, supra note 11, at 276; Fitzgerald, supra note 11, at
192.
105. The Tokyo Convention, supra note 10, art. 6.
106. The Tokyo Convention, supra note 10, art. 1; J.C. STARKE, supra note 11, at 290.
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ing, that a prov1s10n dealing specifically with hijacking was included.1117 All "offenses against penal law" 108 and acts which
"jeopardize the safety of the aircraft" 109 are within the purview of
the Convention. Secondly, while the Convention does refer to the
offense of hijacking, there is no requirement that the state in which
the hijacker is found extradite or prosecute the offender. 110 The Convention merely provides that offenses committed on board aircraft
registered in a contracting state are to be treated, for the purposes
of extradition, as if they had been committed not only in the state
in which they occurred, but also in the state of registration of the
aircraft. 111 Consequently, the Tokyo Convention merely restates customary international law regarding jurisdiction over an airline hijacker without providing steps for enforcement. 112
2. CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF UNLAWFUL SEIZURE OF
AIRCRAFT (The Hague Convention)
The Hague Convention 113 was drafted with the inadequacies of
the Tokyo Convention in mind. 114 Not only did the number of airline
hijackings increase in the 1960's, 115 but the motive for the offense
107. The Tokyo Convention, supra note 10, art. 11. See S. SHUBBER, supra note 9, at 170.
108. The Tokyo Convention, supra note 10, art. 1, para. l(a).
109. Id. art. 1, para. l(b).
110. The United States and the Venezuelan delegation originally proposed that the state
in which the aircraft lands apprehend and prosecute the hijacker. ICAO Doc. 8302-LC/1502, at 102 (1962). This provision was omitted in the final draft. ICAO Doc. 8838-LC/157, at 35
(1969). See Abramovsky, The Hague Convention, supra note 11, at 389.
111. The Tokyo Convention, supra note 10, art. 16.
112. E. MCWHINNEY, THE ILLEGAL DIVERSION OF AIRCRAFT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 41
(1974).
113. A conference was convened at the Hague on December 1, 1970, under the auspices
of the ICAO; to formulate a final draft on the question of the suppression of airline hijacking.
On December 16, 1970 the Conference adopted the final draft of the Convention by a vote of
74 to zero with two abstentions. S. SHUBBER, supra note 9, at 176. As of January 1, 1978, 83
states were parties to the Convention: Argentina, Australia, Austria, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Brazil, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cape
Verde, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Equador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Federal
Republic of Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia,
Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Lebanon, Malawi,
Mali, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Phillipines, Poland, Portu gal, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad & Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republic, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Viet Nam , Yugoslavia, and Zaire.
114. E. McWHINNEY, supra note 112, at 41.
115. See Aircraft Hijacking Hearings, supra note 9, at 6; Abramovsky, The Hague Con-
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also changed. 116 Hijacking was no longer simply a means of escape
for the oppressed from a totalitarian regime. 117 Hijacking had become an epidemic spread by the terrorist, extortionist, and the fugitive from justice. 1111 Stronger measures were necessary to suppress
development of the crime. 119
Accordingly, the purpose of the Hague Convention is to ensure
that anyone guilty of an airline hijacking will be punished for the
offense. 1211 Article 4 requires a contracting state to take whatever
steps are necessary to establish jurisdiction over the offense. 121 This
provision applies to any state in which the aircraft is either registered, lands, has its principle place of business, or where the offender is found. 122
The state in which the hijacker is found has an obligation to
extradite the offender to any state requesting extradition that has
jurisdiction to prosecute. 123 Under Article 8, hijacking "shall be
deemed to be included as an extraditable offense in any extradition
treaty existing between Contracting States." 124 If a contracting state
receives a request for extradition from a state with which it has no
extradition treaty, the Convention may be considered as the legal
basis for extradition. 125 The effect of this provision is to enlarge the
scope of existing international treaties on extradition to include
hijacking. Where a state was prohibited by domestic law from extraditing a hijacker in the absence of a treaty, 126 the state must now
extradite the offender. 127
uention, supra note 11, at 392; Horlick, supra note 11, at 68, 69; N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1978, §

X, at 20, col. 1.
116. N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1978, § X, at 20, col. 5.
117. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
118. See notes 5-8 supra and accompanying text.
119. See Aircraft Hijacking Hearings, supra note 9, at 6.
120. The Hague Convention, supra note 10, preamble.
121. Id. art. 4.
122. Id.
123. Id. art. 7.
Article 7 provides:
The Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged offender is found
shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged, without exception whatsoever and
whether or not the offense was committed in its territory, to submit the case to its
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Those authorities shall take
their decision in the same manner as in the case of any ordinary offence of a serious
nature under the law of that State.
Id.
124. Id. art. 8, para. 1.
125. Id. art. 8, para. 2.
126. See note 99 supra and accompanying text.
127. The Hague Convention, supra note 10, art. 8, para. 2.
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The obligation to extradite an airline hijacker is subject to all
other customary and conventional rules of law governing extraditable offenses. 1211 As a general rule, extradition is denied where an
individual is accused of committing a political offense. 1211 All states
recognize the granting of political asylum as a right to be determined by the state from which it is requested. 130 As the laws of a
state may preclude extradition of an airline hijacker if the offense
is regarded as political, 131 the existence of hijacking in an extradition
treaty does not result in mandatory extradition. 132
If a state does not extradite the offender, the case must be
submitted to the proper authorities for prosecution. 13:1 While such
terms as "without exception whatsoever" 134 are used, Article 7 does
not mandate prosecution. 135 A state in which an airline hijacker is
found must, if it does not extradite the offender, "submit the case
to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution." 1:111 This
may or may not result in prosecution depending upon the law of the
statem and the nature of the individual's offense. 1311
A state does not act in any way contrary to the 1951 Refugee
128. Id.
129. See notes 162-83 infra and accompanying text.
130. See notes 30-35 supra and accompanying text.
131. See Costello, International Te"orism and the Development of the Principle Aut
Dedere Aut Judicare, 10 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 483, 487 (1975).
132. See notes 162-83 infra and accompanying text on the political offense exception to
extradition.
133. The Hague Convention, supra note 10, art. 7.
134. Id.
135. Id. See J.C. STARKE, supra note 11, at 290; Emmanuelli, I,egal Aspects of Aerial
Terorism: The Piecemeal us. the Comprehensive Approach, 10 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 503, 51011 (1975).
136. The Hague Convention, supra note 10, art. 7.
137. According to a State Department report, of eighty Americans who have hijacked
planes, about one-half are abroad as fugitives from the United States. N.Y. Times, May 1,
1977, at 15, col. 1. See Lillich & Paxman, State Responsibility for Injurie.~ to Aliens Occa,o;ioned by Terrori.~t Activities, 26 AM. U.L. REv. 217, 276-80 (1977); Pierre, The Politics of
International Terrorism, 19 ORBIS 1251, 1264 (1976).
138. See, e.g., the case of Raphael Minichiello, who on October 31, 1969 hijacked a TWA
airliner en route to Los Angeles from San Francisco and forced it to fly to Rome, Italy. N.Y.
Times, Nov. 1, 1969, at 1, col.1. The United States requested extradition of Minichiello. Id ..
Nov. 2, 1969, at l, col. 4. The request for extradition was denied on the ~ound that extradition need not be granted if penalties for the crime in the country requesting extradition are
not permitted in the country that could grant it. Italy, unlike the United States, had no
capital punishment for the offense. Id., Nov. 27, 1969, at 11, col. 5. Minichiello was sentenced
to seven and one-half years imprisonment on November 11, 1970. Id., Nov. 12, 1970, at 1,
col. 7. However, on May 1, 1971, six months after sentencing, Minichiello was released from
the Rome prison. Id., May 2, 1971, at 1, col. 1.
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Convention, i:rn if after granting asylum, it institutes proceedings
against the individual for the hijacking. 140 A state may not, however,
grant asylum to any offender, irrespective of his crime. Under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 141 and the 1951 Refugee
Convention, 142 one is only entitled to asylum from persecution based
on "race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion." 143 While the political offense criteria are
the bases upon which extradition is denied or granted, 144 the basis
upon which asylum is granted is limited to escape from persecution.145 Thus, the nature of the hijacking must be determined-whether it was done as a means of escape from persecution,
or whether the hijacking was part of a terrorist plot to gain recognition in the international community for what is claimed to be a
political cause.
3. CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF UNLAWFUL ACTS AGAINST
THE SAFETY OF CIVIL AVIATION (The Montreal Convention)
The Hague Convention is limited to airline hijacking committed on board the aircraft. 146 The Montreal Convention applies to all
acts of sabotage or violence that interfere with international civil
aviation. 147 The Convention declares that no one who sabotages a
civil aircraft, whether on board the aircraft or not, shall find sanctuary anywhere in the world. 148
The provisions of the Montreal Convention on jurisdiction to
apprehend, 149 prosecute, 150 and extradite 151 an offender are exactly
like those of the Hague Convention. 152 In all cases in which an individual must be extradited under the Hague Convention, 15:1 an offender under the Montreal Convention must also be extradited. 154
See Costello, supra note 131, at 496.
The Hague Convention, supra note 10, art. 7.
G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. N810, at 71, art. 14, para. 2 (1948).
1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 21, art. 33, para. 2.
Id.
See note 162 infra and accompanying text.
See M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 34, at 107.
The Hague Convention, supra note 10, art. 1.
The Montreal Convention, supra note 10, art. 1.
N. LEECH, C. OLIVER, & J. SWEENEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE INTERNATINAL
LEGAL SYSTEM 279 (1973).
149. The Montreal Convention, supra note 10, art. 5.
150. Id. art. 7.
151. Id. art. 8.
152. The Hague Convention, supra note 10, arts. 4, 7, and 8 respectively.
153. See notes 94-96 supra and accompanying text.
154. The Montreal Convention, supra note 10, art. 8.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
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While the Montreal Convention was signed to deter abuses of
international airline transportation, 155 tae Convention does not specifically apply to hijacking. 158 Nevertheless, it can be applied to an
airline hijacker where a violent crime, for example, terrorism, is
committed in conjunction with the hijacking. For this reason, the
Montreal Convention is useful in drawing a distinction between the
terrorist hijacker whose activities fall within the purview of both the
Hague 157 and the Montreal1 511 Conventions, and the refugee hijacker
whose act is only in violation of the Hague Convention. 1511
IV

THE POLITICAL OFFENSE

Extradition is granted only when an individual is accused of
committing a very serious offense. 180 Most extradition laws and
treaties exempt certain offenses from extradition even when the
crime of which the fugitive is accused otherwise constitutes an extraditable offense. 181 The most commonly excepted offense is the
political offense. 182 The raison d'etre of the exemption is based primarily on humanitarian grounds-to surrender an unsuccessful
rebel to the demanding state would amount to delivering him to
execution, or at least, the risk of being unfairly tried by other than
an impartial judge. 183
As a general rule, extradition treaties do not define the term
political offense. 184 The term has been applied to both purely political offenses and relative political offenses. A purely political offense
is one directed against the security of a state. m A relative political
155. Id. preamble.
156. Id. art. I.
157. The Hague Convention, supra note 10, art. 1.
158. The Montreal Convention, supra note 10, art. I.
159. The Hague Convention, supra note 10, art. I.
160. J.C. STARKE, supra note 11, at 351.
161. 6 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 30, at 799. See, e.g., Treaty on Extradition of January
21, 1972, United States-Argentina, 23 U.S.T. 3501, T.I.A.S. No. 7510, art. 7 (entered into
force (U.S.) Sept. 15, 1972).
162. 6 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 30, at 800. The principle of non-extradition for political
offenses was first laid down in 1833 in the Belgian Extradition Law. Extradition Law of 1833,
art. IV, LES CODES 693 (31st ed. 1965).
163. M. GARCIA-MORA, supra note 24, at 75. See M.C. BASSIOUNI, Two Models of Extradition in l,aw and Practice, in 2 TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 347, 362 (V. Nanda
& M.C. Bassiouni ed. 1973). See also Evans, Reflections Upon the Political Offenses in
International Practice, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1963); Garcia-Mora, The Nature of Political
<Jffen.'ies: A Knotty Problem of Extradition l..,aw, 48 VA. L. REV. 1226 (1962).
164. 6 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 30, at 804. See Evans, supra note 163, at 15; GarciaMora, The Nature of Political Offenses, supra note 163, at 1230.
165. Purely political offenses are limited to treason, espionage, and sedition. See, e.g.,
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offense is a common crime so connected with a political act or motive that it is considered a political offense. 166 The determination of
whether or not an individual is guilty of a common crime or a relative political offense is made solely on the facts of the specific case
by the state in which the fugitive is located. 167
It has been argued that hijacking can not be regarded, under
any circumstances, as a political offense. 1611 In reality, however,
many states have exempted airline hijackers from extradition on the
grounds of the political offense exception. The classic case in which
a state refused to extradite a hijacker is In re Kavic, Bjelanovic and
Arsenjevic. 169 In that case, three crew members of a Yugoslav airliner diverted the plane to Switzerland where they sought political
asylum. Yugoslavia demanded the extradition of the offenders for
endangering the safety of public transport, wrongful appropriation
of property, and for restraining other members of the crew. The
Swiss Federal Tribunal denied the request for extradition on the
grounds of the political offense exception. The Court recognized
three factors to consider in determining whether or not to refuse
extradition. First, the crime with which the accused was charged
must have been done in furtherance of a political purpose; 1711 secondly, there must be a link between the crime committed and the
In re de Serclaes, 19 I.L.R. 366 (Corte Cass. Italy 1952) (Belgium sought extradition of de
Serclaes from Italy for having been convicted of treason); Denmark (Collaboration with the
Enemy) Case, 16 Ann. Dig. 146 (Sup. Ct. Brazil 1947) (United States refused to extradite
Horacio Julio Ornes, convicted of having committed crimes against the security of the Dominican Republic). See also Matter of the Extradition of Hector Jose Campora and Others, in
53 AM. J. INT'L L. 693 (1957); German Extradition Law of December 23, 1929, art. 3(2) which
provides:
Political acts are those punishable offenses which are directed immediately
against the existence of the security of the State, against the head or a member of
the government of the State, as such, against a body provided for by the constitution,
against the rights of citizens in electing or voting, or against good relations with
foreign states.
.
Reichsgesetzblatt 1, Teil i, § 239 (1929); M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 34, at 379-83; 6 M.
WHITEMAN, supra note 30, at 804-07.
166. A relative political offense must be predominatly political in its motive, objectives,
and the circumstances of its commission. See, e.g., In re Kavic, Bjelanovic and Arsenjevic,
19 l.L.R. 371 (Fed. Trib. Switz. 1952); In re Ficorilli, 18 I.L.R. 345 (Fed . Trib. Switz. 1951);
In re Camporini, 2 Ann. Dig. 283 (Feb. Trib. Switz. 1924).
Other courts find it sufficient that the motive is such as to make the intent for the act
political. See, e.g., In re Campora, in 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 693 (1957) (Sup . Ct. Chile); In re
Fahijan, 7 Ann. Dig. 360 (Sup. Ct. Ger.). See also, M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 34, at 383-88.
167. See M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 34, at 371.
168. Green, supra note 22, at 217.
169. 19 I.L.R. 371 (Fed. Trib. Switz. 1952).
170. Id. at 372-73.
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political purpose; 171 and thirdly, the political objective must predominate the common crime. 172 In the instant case, the purpose of
the act was to enable the hijackers to escape a regime with which
they were in disagreement. The hijacking was the only means to
effectuate their escape. The offenses against the other members of
the crew were not very serious when balanced against the political
freedom and even the existence of the hijackers. 173 The Court, therefore, had no problem denying the request for extradition.
Other courts have been less noble and explicit in their determination to deny extradition of an airline hijacker. On April 14, 1975,
the Chambre d'accusation of the Cour d'appel of Paris refused to
extradite Willie Roger Holder and Mary Katherine Kerkow to the
United States for prosecution of a 1972 aircraft hijacking. 174 The
United States argued that the political offense exception did not
apply to this case. The fugitives did not attempt to overthrow the
Government of the United States; they did not belong to any political group or engage in any political activities; there was no allegation that the fugitives were subject to political persecution. 175 The
airline hijackers made a half-hearted attempt to divert the plant to
Hanoi while demanding a $500,000 ransom. This motive does not
make the crime political. In fact, "the extortion contradicts any
notion of idealism or of 'political character' in this case." 176 The
Cour d' appel did not consider any of the arguments made by the
United States. The court denied the request for extradition based
on the political motive of the hijacker. 177
The Cour d'appel of Paris has consistently denied extradition
of airline hijackers on the political offense exception. On July 2,
1976, the United States formally requested extradition of five Americans who diverted a plane to Algeria in 1972. 1711 The hijackers had
demanded a $1,000,000 ransom in return for the lives of the passengers and crew. Three of the hijackers were also fugitives from justice
who had escaped from prison. Nevertheless, the Cour d'appel accepted the hijackers' contention that the hijacking was done to escape the segregation to which they had been allegedly subjected in
171.
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the United States as members of the Black Panther Party. 1711
The effect of these decisions is to "construe hijacking as a
'political offense' in any case in which a political motive is alleged,
even where large sums of money are extorted under the threat of
murder of the passengers and crew."•Ko Since the term "political
offense" is never defined in a treaty on extradition, a state to which
a request is made is always free to deny extradition on the justification that the particular case falls within its definition of a political
offense. In reality, no distinction is made between the true refugee
hijacker whose only crime is the hijacking to escape persecution,
and the fugitive from justice, extortionist, or terrorist who hijacks a
plane claiming an obscure political motive.
V.

CONCLUSION: A SUGGESTED SOLUTION

The most significant problem with the treatment of airline hijackers is a uniform application of the political offense exception in
all types of cases to prevent extradition of the offender. The difficulty with this approach is that there are, in reality, two distinct
types of hijackers. Different rules of law should apply to each type.
The first type represents the true "refugee hijacker." This
individual hijacks a plane to escape persecution. He has committed
no crime save the illegal use of transportation to protect his life or
physical freedom. The second type of airline hijackers includes
the "criminal hijacker"-the fugitive from justice, the extortionist,
and the terrorist. This type of hijacker has committed a crime in
addition to the hijacking. He claims the hijacking was necessary to
effectuate the political objective of his first crime.
In all cases, a hijacker can lawfully escape extradition on the
basis of the political offense exception. The legal basis on which
asylum is granted, however, is not the same as that of extradition.
One is only entitled to asylum for crimes predicated on race, religion, national origin or persecution on account thereof.'K 1 While a
crime committed to avoid persecution may be deemed a political
offense, •K2 not all political offenses are committed on account of
persecution. •K3 Thus, politically motivated crimes do not fall within
the purview of either the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or
179. Id. at 125.
180. E. McDOWELL, supra note 34, at 174.
181. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71, art.
14 (1948); 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 21, art. 33.
182. In re Kavic, 19 l.L.R. 371 (Fed. Trib. Switz. 1952).
183. See note 165 supra with respect to treason, sedition, and espionage.
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the 1951 Refugee Convention. 184
To distinguish between the rights of the two types of airline
hijackers, a protocol to the Hague and the Montreal Conventions
should be signed. The Conventions should mandate extradition of
all airline hijackers except the true "refugee hijacker". The provision should state:
Extradition of the offender is required in all circumstances, without
exception whatsoever, unless the offender is one who, under Article
14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, has a right to
enjoy asylum from persecution.

This suggestion is not intended to eliminate the political offense exception nor undermine a state's right to determine its definition. The application of the political offense exception should be
eliminated only with respect to hijacking. The basis upon which
extradition would be denied and asylum granted would be the criteria established by the United Nations in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
The purpose of the Hague and the Montreal Conventions is to
prevent the abuse to which airline pilots and passengers have been
subjected for the benefit of the "criminal hijacker." While hijacking
had been used as a means of escape as early as 1948, 185 it was not
until hijacking became the instrument of the terrorist and the extortionist that measures were taken to combat the crime. A protocol
distinguishing between the true "refugee hijacker" and the
"criminal hijacker" would further the purpose of the Conventions.
In conclusion, the Hague and the Montreal Conventions do not
adequately distinguish between the true "refugee hijacker" and the
"criminal hijacker." A protocol would satisfy the distinction by
protecting one who hijacks a plane to escape persecution without
encouraging those with less noble motives to use hijacking to effectuate criminal objectives.
Nancy L. Cohen
184. M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 34, at 107.
185. See note 4 supra.
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